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1. Vivek Wadhwa, Why I Believe That This Will Be the Most Innovative Decade in
History, FORBES (June 25, 2012, 7:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/singularity/2012/06/25/most-innovative-decade-in-history/.
2. See generally Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving
Beyond the Entropic Dilemma, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 625 (2005) (describing the “glaring tension
between free trade and social regulation”).
3. Id. at 626. For a general discussion, see Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating the World
Trade Organization, 96 AM. J. INTL L. 28, 29 (2002); see also Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute
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Over the past twenty years, the world has witnessed technology
advance at an exponential rate—undoubtedly altering the way that
societies function internally and the manner in which they relate to
others. And the age of innovation is just getting started. As one
scholar predicts, “[i]n this and the next decade, we will begin to
make energy and food abundant, inexpensively purify and sanitize
water from any source, cure disease, and educate the world’s
masses.” 1 If that premonition is true, then one can only assume that
globalization will continue to demand cooperation amongst the
world’s masses, at least from those who want to survive, let alone
thrive. However, because “the world’s masses” is a simple and tidied
reference to what is actually a messy amalgam of different stakeholders, certain fundamental tensions are inherent to participation in
the international sphere.
In the context of multilateral trading, a historical tension exists
between economically oriented, laissez-faire, pro-trade concerns
and social, environmental, and health concerns. 2 International trade
scholar Sungjoon Cho eloquently describes this tension as an “inevitable phenomenon considering the multiplicity of values that individuals, states, and institutions pursue.” 3 On the one hand, “[p]eople
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Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 753 (2002); Philip M. Nichols, Forgotten
Linkages—Historical Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism and Analysis of the
World Trade Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 461 (1998).
4. Cho, supra note 2, at 626.
5. See generally id.
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seem to desire free trade—or at least global free markets, driven by
the principle of efficiency—that expands economic opportunity and
promotes material welfare”; on the other hand, people simultaneously value the principle of regulatory autonomy, especially when it
comes to bettering their “social hygiene in the areas of environmental quality and human safety.” 4 But these conflicting values are inextricable from one another in a world that encourages, and quite
frankly mandates, a high level of economic interdependency. Thus,
so long as innovators continue to innovate, as new products enter
the market, and as new scientific information becomes available,
tension between advocates of the free market and social regulators
will persist.
But what if institutional actors could reconcile these conflicting
values—at least toward the more efficient and practical goal of alleviating (rather than eliminating) the underlying tension? This Note
will argue that reconciliation is in fact possible 5—and further, that
significant steps are already being taken to produce the desired result. Part I of this Note discusses the historical tension between regulatory autonomy and free market values, as they surfaced during
the evolution from the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”) to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). Part II explores
the practical implications of the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (“TBT”) by examining a trio of recently decided TBT cases.
Applying this jurisprudence to the currently pending dispute challenging Australia’s Tobacco Plain Packaging Act (“TPPA”), Part III
predicts that Australia will be successful in defending its regulation,
and argues that the outcomes of these TBT cases reflect a step
toward practical reconciliation between market efficiency and regulatory autonomy.
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DISCUSSION
I. FREE TRADE VS. SELF-REGULATION: FUNDAMENTAL
TENSION FROM GATT TO WTO

6.
7.
8.
9.

12/28/2015 14:43:02

Id. at 627.
Id. at 639–40.
Id. at 627.
Susan Aaronson, Historical Roots of GATT and the Failure of the ITO, ECON.
HISTORY ASS’N (Dec. 21, 2014), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/from-gatt-to-wto-the-evolution-ofan-obscure-agency-to-one-perceived-as-obstructing-democracy-2/.
10. Cho, supra note 2, at 629.
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GATT was established in 1947 as an indirect result of the warvictors’ combined effort to create three institutions that would eliminate the causes of war, also known as the “Bretton Woods System.” 6 The Bretton Woods System proposed a tripartite scheme of
international institutions: The International Monetary Fund (“IMF”),
The World Bank (“World Bank”), and the International Trade Organization (“ITO”). The IMF was designed to govern international monetary and financial matters. The World Bank was established to
provide a guiding forum for international development. And finally,
the ITO was created to address broad international trade issues,
including important social issues connected to but not directly within
the scope of “trade” per se. 7 While the first two institutions were successfully materialized and remain important fixtures in the international arena to this day, the ITO was stillborn. Given the broad
spectrum of both trade and social issues that the ITO proposed to
address, Congress feared that agreeing to the ITO would cede too
much power to an international body. After failing to obtain congressional approval, the ITO was reduced to GATT—one of the many
chapters of the originally conceived ITO charter. 8
From 1948 until 1993, GATT operated as a “club” pursuant to
its Protocol of Provisional Application. Essentially, this clause allowed members to “spur trade liberalization or contravene the rules
of GATT when politically or economically necessary.” 9 Thus, GATT
was in no way a binding treaty. Moreover, GATT consisted of little
more than a list of derogations and exemptions, primarily operating
as a vehicle towards the freest of trade. 10 However, GATT did include certain exemptions under Article XX, which clearly responded
to numerous social concerns, including environmental protection
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11. See General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194.
12. Cho, supra note 2, at 629.
13. Id. (describing protestors depicting GATT and free tradists as “cold blooded monsters
who cared little about legitimate environmental protests”).
14. Id. at 651.
15. See Aaronson, supra note 9.
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and human health. 11 And while Article XX provided that those regulatory concerns might be sufficient, under certain circumstances, to
justify “overrid[ing] the free trade obligations set forth in the other
provisions,” 12 GATT espoused an inherent pro-trade bias by labeling
free trade concerns as “obligations” and social concerns as “exemptions.”
To illustrate, consider GATT’s allocation of the burden of proof
compared to that of a criminal proceeding in the United States. In
the latter, the criminal is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty,
and the prosecution has the burden of proving otherwise. That is
because the United States Constitution provides him with a right to
liberty. And while the commission of a criminal act invokes an exception to his right to liberty (e.g., incarceration), the prosecution
bears the burden of proof to show that the exception should apply.
One can transpose this analysis to the GATT structure, where free
trade is a right, and social concerns are the exception. While, in a
criminal proceeding, the criminal prosecutor bears the burden of
proof to show why incarceration applies as an exception to the right
to liberty, the party invoking the exception (e.g., the regulation) under GATT bears the burden of proof to show why that exception
overrides the right to free trade.
Not surprisingly, this pro-trade bias did not sit well with environmentalists and public health organizations. 13 During the fifty
years of growth in world trade under the GATT regime, the presumption working against domestic regulators sparked fury in domestic
policymakers, and in turn minimized their perception of GATT’s legitimacy. 14 By the late 1980s, after several failed attempts to breathe
life into GATT as a meaningful institution, a growing number of nations felt that global trade expansion would be better served by a
more formal international organization. Hence, in 1994, the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”) was born as a product of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the “Uruguay Round”). 15
While the WTO (World Trade Organization) is similar to GATT
(General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade) in that both “have locat-
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ed their primary institutional identity in the disposition of trade issues,” 16 the WTO has a much broader purview. 17 Importantly, the
Uruguay Round produced a new set of rules governing social issues
that provides domestic policymakers, environmentalists, and public
health advocates rights on which to stand: the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (“SPS”) 18 and the TBT. 19 While this Note only
addresses the practical implications of the latter agreement as it has
recently been interpreted by the WTO Panel and Appellate Body, it
is worthwhile to note that the SPS and the TBT complement one
another in an effort to “strike[] a delicate balance between the policy
goals of trade facilitation and national autonomy in technical regulations.” 20
II. TBT ARTICLE 2.2 AND A TRIO OF CASES

12/28/2015 14:43:02

16. Cho, supra note 2, at 639–40.
17. See Aaronson, supra note 9 (noting that the WTO covers “subsidies, intellectual
property, food safety and other policies that were once solely the subject of national governments”).
18. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867
U.N.T.S. 493, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201867/v1867.pdf.
19. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201868/v1868.pdf [hereinafter TBT].
20. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade Summary,
GLOB.
TRADE
NEGOTS.:
CTR.
FOR
INT’L
DEV.
AT
HARVARD
UNIV.,
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/spstbt.html (last updated Apr. 2004).
21. Cho, supra note 2, at 665.
22. Id. at 651. The focus on the “content” of a given domestic measure left room for the
reviewing panels to second-guess or negate the legitimate policy objectives and/or social
values of the regulating state.
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Juxtaposed to the content-oriented approach under GATT, the
SPS and TBT focus on process—or manner—oriented disciplines.
That is, they are concerned with “how to regulate” rather than “what
to regulate.” 21 This becomes extremely important when examined
against the backdrop of the “world’s masses”: these are groups
comprised of governments, public and private institutions, and individuals, separated by culture, development, religion, and politics,
with such degrees of separation often resulting in a divergence in
values among them. Under the old GATT, the content-oriented approach left ample room for the adjudicating body to negate the social
values of the regulating state. 22 By contrast, the TBT is structured to
achieve two opposing goals simultaneously: ensuring trade liberali-
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zation while allowing WTO members to adopt technical regulations
to pursue their legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of
human health or the environment. Thus, the structure of the TBT
seeks to alleviate the historical tension between free trade and social regulation. TBT Article 2.2, specifically, is a tool of reconciliation
between these competing values, as it limits the degree of traderestrictiveness to the extent necessary to fulfill legitimate objectives.
The scope of the application of the TBT includes every technical
regulation pertaining to products. “Technical regulation” is defined in
Annex 1.1 of the TBT as a “[d]ocument which lays down product
characteristics or their related process and production methods . . .” 23 The second sentence of Annex 1.1 of the TBT further
states that a regulation that applies to a product is a “technical regulation” if it addresses product characteristics. 24 TBT Article 2.2 states
as follows:
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared,
adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than
necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, taking account of the
risks non-fulfillment would create. Such legitimate objectives
are, inter alia: national security requirements; the prevention of
deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal
or plant life or health, or the environment. In assessing such risks,
relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and technical information, related processing technology or intended end-uses of products. 25

12/28/2015 14:43:02

23. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Article 2.2, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201868/v1868.pdf [hereinafter TBT 2.2]
(emphasis added).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove
Cigarettes, ¶ 7.333, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/R (adopted Sept. 2, 2011) [hereinafter US Clove
Cigarettes Panel Report].
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Therein, the language of the provision requires that any challenge brought under Article 2.2 must undergo a two-step analysis.
The adjudicating body must first determine whether the regulating
country has a legitimate objective; second, it must decide whether
the particular regulation is more trade-restrictive than necessary to
fulfill that objective. 26 Furthermore, the relevant case law mandates
an additional consideration, which may or may not be organically
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addressed by the two-step analysis 27: if the current regulation does
contribute to achieving a legitimate objective, does the complaining
party provide sufficient evidence of a proposed alternative that is
equally effective in furthering the goal? While Article 2.2 has been
historically underexplored, the WTO’s Panel and Appellate Body has
recently decided a trio of cases that, when taken together, provide
clarity and guidance. 28
A. US Tuna II: A “Dolphin-Safe” Tuna Labeling Scheme

12/28/2015 14:43:02

27. Appellate Body Report, United States—Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL)
Requirements, ¶ 461, WTO Doc. WT/DS384/AB/R and WT/DS386/AB/R (adopted June 29,
2012), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/384_386abr_e.pdf [hereinafter US COOL
Appellate Body Report].
28. See generally id.; US Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 26; Appellate Body
Report, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna
and Tuna Products, ¶ 172, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R (adopted May 16, 2012),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/381abr_e.pdf [hereinafter US Tuna II Appellate
Body Report].
29. US Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra note 28, ¶ 172.
30. Elizabeth Trujillo, The WTO Appellate Body Knocks Down U.S. “Dolphin Safe” Tuna
Labels but Leaves a Crack for PPMs, 16 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS 25 (July 26, 2012),
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/25/wto-appellate-body-knocks-down-us-”dolphinsafe”-tuna-labels-leaves.
31. US Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra note 28, ¶ 172.
32. Id.
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The Appellate Body’s reasoning and ultimate decision in the
case of United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US Tuna II) indicates a
willingness to take advantage of the room for regulation carved out
by Article 2.2. In that case, Mexico challenged a labeling scheme
enacted by the United States under its Dolphin Protection Consumer
Information Act (“DPCIA”), claiming that it violated Articles 2.1 and
2.2 of the TBT. 29 The labeling scheme under DPCIA reflects a prominent environmental concern and is designed to protect dolphins by
providing information to consumers about how tuna was caught. 30
Specifically, fisheries and retailers can only apply the “dolphin-safe”
label if the tuna was caught using methods that do not include setting on dolphins or driftnet fishing on the high seas. 31 And while it is
not obligatory for the importation or sale of tuna in the United States
market 32—in other words, retailers are still able to sell their tuna
product in the market without a “dolphin-safe” label—the underlying
idea is that consumers prefer to purchase a tuna product bearing a
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“dolphin-safe” label. Thus, the DPCIA creates an impetus for fisheries to catch tuna without posing a risk to dolphins. 33
The Appellate Body found that the DPCIA violated Article 2.1 of
the TBT, which prohibits “less favorable treatment,” because the
measure modified the competitive condition of the market to the
detriment of Mexican tuna products. 34 Moreover, the DPCIA conditioned eligibility for the “dolphin-safe” label upon documentary evidence, depending on whether the tuna was harvested inside or
outside of the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (the “ETP”). 35 Where
tuna was harvested inside the ETP, there was a difficult-to-satisfy
evidentiary requirement; where tuna was caught outside the ETP,
there was no evidentiary requirement. 36 Thus, non-ETP tuna was
automatically eligible for the dolphin-safe label, even if dolphins had
in fact been seriously injured. Thus, while the DPCIA did not discriminate against Mexico on its face, the measure did not apply evenhandedly: Mexican fisheries primarily harvest tuna inside the ETP
and it would be “impossible” to overhaul the entire Mexican tuna
industry to satisfy the DPCIA’s requirements. 37
However, despite finding a violation of Article 2.1 of the TBT,
the Appellate Body found that the measure was consistent with Article 2.2. In other words, while the application of the measure was de
facto discriminatory, 38 the measure itself was not “more restrictive
than necessary.” 39
1. Legitimate Objective?

12/28/2015 14:43:02

33. Id. ¶ 29. The United States introduced evidence in support of the contention that, at
the time the measure at issue was adopted, “there was strong consumer sentiment that setting on dolphins to catch tuna was unacceptable and that something should be done to ensure
that consumers had a choice not to purchase a product that contained tuna caught in association with dolphins.” Id.
34. Id. ¶ 284.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. ¶ 300.
38. See id. ¶ 375.
39. Id.
40. Id. ¶ 313.
41. Id.
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In US Tuna II, the Appellate Body defined “objective” as a “thing
aimed at or sought; a target, a goal, an aim.” 40 It defined the word
“legitimate” as “lawful; justifiable; proper.” 41 To determine the “objective” under Article 2.2 of the TBT, “a panel must assess what a
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Member seeks to achieve . . . [and] may take into account the texts
of statutes, legislative history, and other evidence regarding the
structure and operation of the measure.” 42 In US Tuna II, the objective at issue was twofold: (1) to “ensur[e] that consumers are not
misled or deceived about whether tuna products contain tuna that
was caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins”; and (2) to
“contribut[e] to the protection of dolphins by ensuring that the [United
States] market is not used to encourage fishing fleets to catch tuna
in a manner that adversely affects dolphins.” 43 The lack of analysis
suggests that the legitimate objective prong was not at issue in the
US Tuna II case. Thus, there seems to be an underlying assumption
that protecting the lives of dolphins, both directly and indirectly by
providing accurate information to consumers, is a “target, [] goal, [or]
aim” that is “lawful, justifiable, [and] proper.” 44
2. More Trade Restrictive than Necessary to Achieve the Legitimate Objective?

(i) the degree of contribution made by the measure to the legitimate objective at issue;
(ii) the trade-restrictiveness of the measure; and
(iii) the nature of the risks at issue and the gravity of consequences that would arise from non-fulfillment of the objective(s) pursued
by the Member through the measure. 46

As the complainant bearing the burden of proof, Mexico suggested that the United States could have adopted an alternative
regulation that would have been less trade restrictive. Specifically,

12/28/2015 14:43:02

42. Id. ¶ 314.
43. Id. ¶ 20.
44. See id. ¶ 330 n.663.
45. Id. ¶ 150.
46. Id. ¶ 322. It is important to note that the complainant bears the burden of proof in
showing that a technical regulation is inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the TBT.
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In determining whether the regulation fulfills the legitimate objective, the Appellate Body reasoned that the degree of achievement
of a particular objective may be discerned from the design, structure,
and operation of the technical regulation, as well as from evidence
relating to the application of the measure. 45 Moreover, in analyzing
the phrase “unnecessary obstacles to international trade” together
with “not . . . more trade restrictive than necessary,” with the latter
qualifying the former, the Appellate Body looked to the following
factors:
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47. Id. ¶ 59.
48. Id. ¶ 330.
49. Id.
50. Jonathan Carlone, Note, An Added Exception to the TBT Agreement After Clove,
Tuna II, and Cool, 37 B. C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 103, 121 (2014).
51. Id.
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Mexico argued that the Agreement on the International Dolphin
Conservation Program (“AIDCP”) label (which could be obtained
despite setting on dolphins) and the US “dolphin-safe” label should
be allowed to coexist in the United States market. 47 Mexico argued
that AIDCP’s “dolphin-safe” label would provide consumers with
information about methods other than the strict no-setting measure
used to protect dolphins.
In comparing the current measure with Mexico’s proposed alternative, the Appellate Body partially combined its analysis as to
the “degree of contribution made by the measure” as well as the
“trade-restrictiveness” of the measure. Specifically, in contemplating
the degree of contribution made by the United States’ measure to
the legitimate objective at issue, the Appellate Body determined that
the United States’ labeling scheme fulfills its objective to a greater
degree than Mexico’s proposed alternative. 48 Since, under the proposed alternative measure, tuna caught in the ETP by setting on
dolphins would be eligible for the AIDCP’s “dolphin-safe” label, it
would contribute to the objective to a lesser degree than the current
measure. Specifically, it has the potential to mislead consumers, and
more importantly “it would allow more tuna harvested in conditions
that adversely affect dolphins to be labeled ‘dolphin-safe.’” 49 Thus,
Mexico failed to show a less-restrictive alternative to the current
measure that could successfully contribute to the legitimate objective of dolphin protection.
Ultimately, even though the Appellate Body found the measure
inconsistent with Article 2.1, it found the labeling scheme consistent
with Article 2.2. 50 Thus, to comply with the ruling, the United States
had to make the labeling requirements outside the ETP match the
more stringent requirements inside the ETP. 51 Because the measure
was found to be noncompliant with Article 2.1, it is clear that free
trade is still a reckoning concern in the eyes of the WTO. However,
the case illustrates that, by allocating the burden of proof onto the
complaining party, TBT Article 2.2 procedurally aligns itself with the
theory that a defending regulator is “innocent until proven guilty.”
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B. US Clove Cigarettes: A Complete Ban

12/28/2015 14:43:02

52. Lucas Ballet, Comment, Losing Flavor: Indonesia’s WTO Complaint Against the U.S.
Ban on Clove Cigarettes, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 515, 517 (2011).
53. Id. at 518.
54. Id. at 517.
55. Appellate Body Report, United States֩֩Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of
Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 26, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/AB/R (adopted Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter US
Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report].
56. US Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 26, ¶ 2.4 (emphasis added).
57. Ballet, supra note 52, at 516–17.
58. Carlone, supra note 50, at 109.
59. Ballet, supra note 52, at 516–17.
60. Tania Voon, Cigarettes and Public Heath at the WTO: The Appeals of the TBT Labeling Disputes Begin, 16 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS 6 (Feb. 28, 2012),
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/6/cigarettes-and-public-health-wto-appeals-tbtlabeling-disputes-begin.

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 146 Side A

In 2009, President Obama signed the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (“FSPTCA”). 52 The United States
House Energy and Commerce Committee had proposed the
FSPTCA with a goal towards reducing the number of young Americans who begin smoking. 53 The Act provided the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) with a new broad statutory authority to regulate tobacco products under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (“FDCA”). 54 Section 101 of the FSPTCA adds chapter IX, section 907(a)(1)(A) to the FDCA, banning the production and sale of
cigarettes with certain characterizing flavors. 55 Specifically, section
907(a)(1)(A) of the FDCA (included via the FSPTCA) prohibits cigarettes containing characterizing flavors “‘(other than tobacco or menthol) or [from containing an] herb or spice.’” The flavors prohibited
by section 907(a)(1)(A) include (but are not limited to), “strawberry,
grape, orange, clove, cinnamon, pineapple, vanilla, coconut, licorice, cocoa, chocolate, cherry, or coffee.” 56
Indonesia, the largest exporter of clove cigarettes to the United
States before the ban, 57 challenged the FSPTCA claiming that it
violated Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT. Menthol cigarettes are primarily produced in the United States, whereas clove cigarettes are
primarily produced in Indonesia. 58 Thus, Indonesia argued that banning clove cigarettes while continuing to permit the sale of menthol
cigarettes 59 would discriminate against Indonesia in violation of Article 2.1 of the TBT and GATT Article III: 4. 60 The outcome was identical to that in US Tuna II, as the US Clove Cigarettes Appellate
Body found the ban to be inconsistent with Article 2.1, but consistent
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with Article 2.2. 61 Because the United States only appealed the
Panel’s decision in finding a violation of Article 2.1, the US Clove
Cigarettes Appellate Body Report does not delve into the analysis
conducted under Article 2.2. Therefore, the US Tuna II Panel’s discussion remains the guide for purposes of the Article 2.2 analysis.
Keeping in mind the fact that Indonesia had the burden of proof
as the complaining party in US Clove Cigarettes, its claim was unsuccessful with respect to Article 2.2 of the TBT for two main reasons. First, the Panel stated that Indonesia failed to show that the
ban on clove cigarettes did not contribute to the prevention of youth
smoking. 62 Second, Indonesia failed to show that an alternative,
less-restrictive measure would contribute to the legitimate objective
pursued by the United States. 63
1. Legitimate Objective?

Consistent with the overall intent of the bill to protect the public
health, including by reducing the number of children and adolescents who smoke cigarettes, section 907(a)(1) is intended to pro-

12/28/2015 14:43:02

61. See US Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 26, ¶ 7.432; US Clove Cigarettes
Appellate Body Report, supra note 55, ¶ 233.
62. Leonid Shmatenko, Regulatory Measures Through Plain Packaging of Tobacco
Products in the Light of International Trade Agreements, 4 CZECH Y.B. INT’L L. 27, 38 (2013).
63. Id.
64. US Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra note 28, ¶ 322.
65. Id.
66. See US Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra note 28, ¶ 313 (defining the term
“legitimate objective”).
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In US Tuna II, the Appellate Body defined “objective” as a “thing
aimed at or sought; a target, a goal, an aim.” 64 It defined the word
“legitimate” as “lawful; justifiable; proper.” 65 Just as the protection of
dolphins satisfied this definition in US Tuna II, the protection of public health by reducing youth smoking in US Clove Cigarettes was
also considered a legitimate objective—that is, a target, goal, or aim
that is lawful, justifiable, and proper. 66
The parties in US Clove Cigarettes agreed that the public health
objective of the clove cigarette ban was to reduce youth smoking.
And while the objective of the FSPTCA, and of section 907(a)(1)(A)
in particular, is not set forth in the FSPTCA itself, the Panel referred
to the explanations provided by a House Energy and Commerce
Committee Report, which stated:
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hibit the manufacture and sale of cigarettes with certain ‘characterizing flavors’ that appeal to youth. 67

With the Committee Report as its guide, the Panel rejected Indonesia’s arguments that the true objective of the ban was not “legitimate” because it excluded menthol cigarettes as a result of a
political compromise and out of concern for potential loss of U.S.
jobs. 68 The Panel stated that even if Indonesia’s assertions were
true, it would not detract from the “legitimacy” of the objective. 69
2. More Trade Restrictive than Necessary to Achieve the Legitimate Objective?
The Panel prefaced its second prong analysis by noting that
“‘the level of protection’ sought is directly connected to the question
of whether a measure is ‘more trade-restrictive than necessary.’” 70
Indonesia argued that the ban on clove cigarettes was more restrictive than necessary because it greatly exceeded the level of protection sought by the United States. Specifically, because a large
number of cigarettes purportedly smoked by youth were not banned
by the FSPTCA, Indonesia argued that the level of protection sought
by the regulation must be deterrence, not strict prohibition, of adolescent tobacco consumption. 71 The Panel flatly rejected this line of
reasoning, stating that “[g]iven the U.S. Government’s long and frustrating experience in trying to limit youth smoking, the ‘high’ level of
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67. US Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 26, ¶ 2.6–¶ 2.7 (citing H.R. Rep. No.
111-58, pt. 1, at 37 (2009)).
68. Id. ¶ 7.345. Indonesia called the ban a “‘disguised restriction’ on international trade
and ‘a wolf disguised in the sheep’s clothing’ of public health.”
69. Id. ¶ 7.347–7.349. “It is self-evident that measures to reduce youth smoking are
aimed [at] the protection of human health, and Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement explicitly
mentions the ‘protection of human health’ as one of the ‘legitimate objectives’ covered by that
provision.” In EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body stated that “the objective pursued by the
measure is the preservation of human life and health through the elimination, or reduction, of
the well-known, and life-threatening, health risks posed by asbestos fibres. The value pursued
is both vital and important in the highest degree.’ In addition, we recall that in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, the Appellate Body agreed with the panel that ‘few interests are more vital and
important than protecting human beings from health risks.’” Id. ¶ 7.347.
70. Id. ¶ 7.370. Both parties agreed with this assertion, which comes from the sixth
recital to the preamble of the TBT Agreement, stating that “no country should be prevented
from taking measures ‘necessary . . . for the protection of human . . . life or health . . . at the
levels it considers appropriate.’” Id. Furthermore, the Panel noted previous explanations offered by the Appellate Body: “in order to qualify as an alternative, a measure proposed by the
complaining Member must be not only less trade restrictive than the measure at issue, but
should also ‘preserve for the responding Member its right to achieve its desired level of protection with respect to the objective pursued.’” Id.
71. Id. ¶ 7.371.
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protection sought by the United States is evidenced by the measure
applied—a complete ban.” 72
Next, the Panel applied the following factors as established in
US Tuna II:
(i) the degree of contribution made by the measure to the legitimate objective at issue;
(ii) the trade-restrictiveness of the measure; and
(iii) the nature of the risks at issue and the gravity of consequences that would arise from non-fulfillment of the objective(s) . . .

Under the first factor of the “Necessary” test, the Panel examined whether banning clove cigarettes makes a material contribution
to the objective of reducing youth smoking. Among the various arguments set forth by Indonesia and rejected by the Panel was that
prohibiting only a “tiny sliver” of the cigarettes smoked by youth
could not make a material contribution to the public health objective
of reducing youth smoking. 73 This did nothing for Indonesia, as the
argument seems to suggest that the measure is actually less traderestrictive than necessary to fulfill its objective. 74 Furthermore, the
extensive scientific evidence before the Panel provided overwhelming support for the ban and its ability to contribute to the objective of
reducing youth smoking. 75 It is particularly important to note that the
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72. Id. ¶ 7.372. (“The level at which the United States considers appropriate to protect
public health is to eliminate from the market, not simply restrict access to, those products that
are disproportionately used by young people.”).
73. Id. ¶ 7.395.
74. Id. The Panel explained that this “would mean that, in order to make a material contribution to the objective of reducing youth smoking, the United States would have to ban more
types of cigarettes than it has.” Id. Thus, the Panel failed “to see how the ban on clove cigarettes can be found to be ‘more trade-restrictive than necessary’ to fulfil [sic] its objective
based on the conclusion that it is less trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil [sic] its objective.” Id.
75. Id. ¶ 7.401–¶ 7.415. “Some researchers have suggested that eugenol, which is
present in substantial quantities in clove cigarette smoke . . . anesthetizes the backs of smokers’ throats and tracheas, permitting deeper inhalation and possibly encouraging smoking in
persons who might otherwise be dissuaded by the harshness of regular cigarettes.” Id. ¶7.402
(citing CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, EPIDEMIOLOGIC NOTES AND REPORTS
ILLNESSES POSSIBLY ASSOCIATED WITH SMOKING CLOVE CIGARETTES, 34 MMRW W EEKLY 21,
297–99 (May 31, 1985), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00000549.htm). “Clove
cigarettes are sometimes referred to as ‘trainer cigarettes’ and may serve as ‘gateway’ products that introduce young people to smoking.” Id. ¶ 7.406 (citing Susan Farrer, Alternative
Cigarettes May Deliver More Nicotine Than Conventional Cigarettes, 18 NAT’L INST. ON DRUG
ABUSE
NOTES
2
(Aug.
2003),
http://archives.drugabuse.gov/NIDA_Notes/NNVol18N2/Alternative.html). “[F]lavoured cigarettes can promote youth initiation and help young occasional smokers to become daily smokers by reducing or masking the natural harshness and taste of tobacco smoke and increasing
the acceptability of a toxic product.” Id. ¶ 7.408 (citing Carrie M. Carpenter et al., New Ciga-
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Panel took into account certain guidelines set forth by the World
Health Organization Framework on Tobacco Control (“WHO FCTC”)
(recommending the regulation of flavored tobacco), as this could
help to shape the direction of further decisions. 76 Given the “genuine
relationship of ends and means” between the objective pursued and
the measure at issue, the Panel found that the ban on clove cigarettes makes a material contribution to the objective of reducing
youth smoking. 77
Indonesia further argued that even if the ban materially contributed to the objective, there were less-restrictive alternatives available that would make an equivalent contribution. The following is a
non-exhaustive list of alternatives proposed by Indonesia: “restricting the sales of cigarettes to adult-only locations”; “limiting the display of tobacco products”; “placing strict requirements on
packaging”; and “requiring health warnings.” 78 While the Panel stated that “[i]t seems clear enough that each of these measures would
be less trade-restrictive than the ban, . . . the mere listing of two
dozen alternative measures without more does not show that such
measures would make an equivalent contribution to the achievement of the objective . . . .” 79 And finally, the Panel emphasized that
even if the listing of such alternative measures could be found sufficient to establish a prima facie case, the United States successfully
trumped such claims by showing that many of those alternative
measures were already in place—and that those alternatives have
failed. 80

For the third time in a row, in United States—Certain Country of
Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements (US COOL), the Appellate

12/28/2015 14:43:02

rette Brands with Flavors that Appeal to Youth: Tobacco Marketing Strategies, 24 HEALTH AFF.
(2005).
76. Id. ¶ 7.413 (citing World Health Organization, The Scientific Basis of Tobacco Product Regulation, WHO TECH. REPORT SERIES 945 (2007). A study group of eleven experts
established by the WHO FCTC noted that “[t]he recent production and promotion of flavored
tobacco products is a major public health concern” as the “flavors could entice youth to experiment with tobacco products.” Id. As such, the WHO FCTC study group recommends that
“[r]egulations should be developed to prohibit manufacturing and marketing of candy-like and
exotically flavoured tobacco products targeting young and novice smokers.” Id.
77. Id. ¶ 7.417.
78. Id. ¶ 7.422.
79. Id. ¶ 7.423.
80. Id. ¶ 7.425.
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See US COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 27, ¶ 8.3.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7.7, 7.10.
Id. ¶ 348.
Id. ¶ 7.17.
Id. ¶ 287.

12/28/2015 14:43:02

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 148 Side B

Body found a regulatory measure to be discriminatory in violation of
Article 2.1, yet shied away from declaring the respective measures
“more trade-restrictive than necessary,” thereby declaring the measure to be consistent with Article 2.2 of the TBT. 81 First, a brief discussion of the facts and conclusion as to Article 2.1 is necessary to
understand the analysis under Article 2.2.
Canada and Mexico (the complainants) alleged that the United
States’ country of origin labeling (“COOL”) requirements for beef and
pork violated, inter alia, Article 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT. 82 The measure at issue in US COOL was the United States’ Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, as amended by the 2008 Farm Bill and
implemented through an Interim Final Rule of July 28, 2008, which
imposed labeling requirements on beef and pork to be sold at retail
that was produced from imported cattle and hogs. 83 With respect to
Article 2.1, the complainants successfully argued that the COOL
measure was discriminatory because it accorded less favorable
treatment to imported livestock than domestic livestock. 84 In reaching its conclusion, the Appellate Body focused on the de facto disparate impacts of the COOL measure as it modified the conditions of
the market to the detriment of the complainants—a comparable
analysis to that applied in US Tuna II, discussed supra Part II(A).
Specifically, in order for retailers to have the information necessary to comply with the COOL measure and to apply the appropriate
label (out of the four options prescribed), the upstream meat producers had to segregate livestock according to origin. 85 This recordkeeping process was expensive, and imposed additional costs on
producers and retailers alike. Consequently, the measure incentivized the United States’ beef and pork industries to rely exclusively
on U.S. livestock, as they could then avoid the measure altogether. 86 To that end, the COOL measure disadvantaged the complainant exporters of cattle and hogs in violation of Article 2.1.
However, the next step of the TBT analysis in US COOL solidified a pattern that will be difficult to ignore with respect to future (and
currently pending) TBT disputes: despite violating Article 2.1, the
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Appellate Body found that the measure itself was not “more traderestrictive than necessary” and thus did not violate Article 2.2. 87
1. Legitimate Objective?
In this case, the Panel found, and the Appellate Body upheld,
that the objective of the COOL measure was to provide consumers
information about the origin of beef and pork products. As to the
question of legitimacy, the Appellate Body critiqued certain aspects
of the Panel’s analysis but ultimately upheld the Panel’s conclusion
that the origin requirement was a legitimate objective. Notably, the
Appellate Body’s affirmation was rooted in the burden of proof allocation under TBT. Here, the complainants failed to show, through
either arguments or evidence, that providing consumers with information is not a legitimate objective. 88
2. More Trade Restrictive than Necessary to Achieve the Legitimate Objective?

12/28/2015 14:43:02

87. US COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 27, ¶ 8.3.
88. Id. ¶ 453.
89. Id. ¶ 468.
90. Id. ¶ 479 (stating that the measure seemed to be of a “considerable degree of trade
restrictiveness” and that the risks posed by non-fulfillment “would not be particularly grave”).
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Under the “Necessary” prong of its analysis, the Appellate Body
sought to review the same principal measures as it had in US Tuna
II and US Clove Cigarettes: (i) the degree of the measure’s contribution to achieving the legitimate objective, (ii) the trade-restrictiveness
of the measure, and (iii) the nature of the risks at issue and the gravity of the consequences that would arise from non-fulfillment. It is
important to note that the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s conclusion that the COOL measures violated Article 2.2, despite the fact
that it could not complete the majority of the legal analysis for lack of
sufficient evidence. 89 First, the Appellate Body could not determine
with any specificity the degree of the measure’s contribution. As to
the second and third factors, the Appellate Body seemed to indicate
that they would probably have failed the “Necessary” test had the
Panel made clear and precise findings based on sufficient evidence. 90 Despite such an impression, the Appellate Body reversed
the Panel’s finding that the COOL measures were inconsistent with
Article 2.2 because the Panel had contrived and applied a “minimal
threshold” analysis. In fact, the reversal was based solely on the
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91. Id. ¶ 7.352.
92. Id. ¶ 461.
93. Id. ¶ 468.
94. Id. ¶ 476 (noting that the clearest label would indicate countries of birth, raising, and
slaughter of livestock from which meat is derived, and the most confusing label would at least
provide some information as to the origin).
95. Id. ¶ 461.
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Appellate Body’s determination that the COOL measures contributed, at least to some extent, to the legitimate objective of providing
consumers with information. 91
In a defining moment for TBT jurisprudence, the Appellate Body
explained that there is no “minimum threshold of fulfillment” required
to satisfy Article 2.2. 92 In other words, instead of focusing on whether the particular measure fulfills the underlying objective completely,
or meets some minimal level of fulfillment, the more appropriate
question is whether the measure makes an actual contribution to the
objective. 93 To this extent, the Appellate Body seemed to suggest
that this inquiry is qualitative, rather than quantitative. Here, even
the most confusing labels under the COOL scheme provided more
information than was previously available, 94 and thus contributed to
the legitimate objective of providing consumers with information
about beef and pork products. This line of reasoning has important
implications for future dispute adjudication. First, while the degree of
a measure’s contribution to achieving its legitimate objective is a
factor formally prescribed by the Appellate Body, in actuality, it is a
question of whether the measure contributes to achieving the objective at all. The reasoning in US COOL seems to suggest that even
where a particular measure’s contribution to achieving a legitimate
objective is minimal, it is still better than nothing at all. However,
where the complaining party argues that an alternative measure is
less restrictive (as is basically required for any complaining party to
succeed on an Article 2.2 challenge 95), the degree of the current
measure’s contribution becomes important to the extent that it can
be compared to that of the proposed alternative.
Taken together, US Tuna II, US Clove Cigarette, and US COOL
reveal that TBT Article 2.2 allows for deference to the social concerns of regulating states—a concept that was historically absent
from dispute adjudication under the old GATT. One might perceive
this trio of cases as espousing bias in favor of social regulation at
the expense of trade liberalization, but this perception would be
wrong. It is a delicate balancing act. However, it is true that the Ap-
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pellate Body seems unwilling to use Article 2.2 to strike down a
regulation unless the complaining party can show that a less traderestrictive alternative would contribute to the achievement of the
regulating state’s legitimate social concern. To understand that this
is not bias, one could imagine a set of scales, with “social regulation”
on the left scale and “free-trade” on the right, each weighing exactly
the same. If the social regulation could be struck down entirely, removing all weight from the left scale, the result would look like the
unbalanced multilateral trading regime under the old GATT: unopposed, free-trade domination. However, TBT assumes that both
scales should maintain some weight. For example, TBT 2.2 will only
get rid of the current social regulation if there is another alternative
to take its place—to preserve its weight. And in situations where the
measure is found to be discriminatory under TBT 2.1, thereby offsetting the balance in favor of social regulation at the expense of free
trade, the measure must be altered. 96
III. AUSTRALIA’S TOBACCO PLAIN PACKAGING ACT
VIEWED IN LIGHT OF RECENT TBT JURISPRUDENCE

96.
97.

12/28/2015 14:43:02

See, e.g., US Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra note 28.
Rob Mcguirk, Australian Court OKs Logo Ban on Cigarette Packs, USA TODAY (Aug.
14,
2012),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-08-14/australia-logocigarette-pack-ban/57059912/1.
98. Id.
99. Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Austl.) ch 2 pt 2 div 1 para 20 [hereinafter
TPPA]; see also Mcguirk, supra note 97.
100. World Trade Organization Panel to Hear Oral Arguments on Australia Tobacco Plain
Packaging Case from June 1-5, 2015, ACTION ON SMOKING & HEALTH (June 1, 2015)
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In 2011, Australia implemented what has been deemed “the
world’s toughest law on cigarette promotion.” 97 Despite the law’s
reputation of stringency, this Note predicts that the law will be upheld against attack under Article 2.2 as a transplant of the reasoning
in the aforementioned TBT cases, which suggests that plain packaging would not be more trade-restrictive than necessary.
In an effort to improve public health by “discouraging smoking,”
and “encouraging cessation,” 98 Australia’s Tobacco Plain Packaging
Act (“TPPA”) prohibits tobacco companies from displaying their distinctive logos on cigarette packs. 99 Since the TPPA’s enactment,
Ukraine, Honduras, Cuba, Indonesia, and the Dominican Republic
have commenced disputes in the WTO, and a record forty more
countries seek to be joined in the dispute settlement process. 100 In
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addition to its proscription on trademarks, the TPPA further requires
that tobacco product packages be “drab dark brown” in a matte finish, with no visible brand features other than the brand and variant
name in a standard form and font below a mandatory graphic health
warning. 101 And finally, the TPPA prescribes a standardized shape
for cigarette packs and cartons. Together, these regulations constitute the measures at issue in the pending WTO dispute settlement
proceedings.
In its complaint, Ukraine alleges, inter alia, that the TPPA violates certain provisions of the TBT Agreement. Following the Appellate Body’s interpretation of Annex 1.1, the plain packaging at issue
in this dispute would be found to be a “product characteristic” that
applies to an identifiable product: tobacco. Specifically, Ukraine argues that the TPPA violates Article 2.2 of the TBT because Australia’s “measures constitute an unnecessary obstacle to trade and are
more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve the stated health
objectives.” 102
1. Legitimate Objective?
The stated goals of the TPPA are as follows:
[T]o improve public health by: (i) discouraging people from taking
up smoking or using tobacco products; and (ii, () encouraging
people to give up smoking and to stop using tobacco products;
and (iii, () discouraging people who have given up smoking . . . from relapsing, and (iv) reducing people’s exposure to
smoke from tobacco products. 103

12/28/2015 14:43:02

http://www.ash.org.uk/media-room/press-releases/:world-trade-organization-panel-to-hearoral-arguments-on-australia-tobacco-plain-packaging-case-from-june-1-5-2015.
101. TPPA, supra note 99, at ch 2 pt 2 div 1 para 19(2)–(3).
102. Request for Consultations by Ukraine, Australia – Certain Measures Concerning
Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and
Packaging: Request for Consultations by Ukraine, 3, WTO Doc. WT/DS434/1 (Mar. 15, 2012).
103. TPPA, supra note 99, at ch 1 pt 1 sub-para 3(1).
104. See TBT 2.2, supra note 23.
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The legitimacy of this objective will likely not be disputed in the
Australia TPPA case. First, the TBT explicitly includes the protection
of public health as one of the legitimate objectives the agreement is
intended to cover. 104 To that end, a breadth of scientific knowledge
makes the negative health impacts of tobacco consumption hard to
ignore. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), tobaccorelated diseases are now “the single most important cause of pre-
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ventable deaths in the world.” 105 Attributing over twenty major categories of fatal and disabling diseases to tobacco consumption, the
WHO predicts that tobacco will cause an estimated 100 million
deaths over the next twenty years. 106 Currently, tobacco consumption kills nearly 6 million people per year. 107 “[A]pproximately one
person dies every six seconds due to tobacco, accounting for one in
ten adult deaths[,] [and] [u]p to half of current users will eventually
die of a tobacco-related disease.” 108 Unfortunately, Australian tobacco consumers are not immune to tobacco’s negative health impacts. 109
To be sure, the Appellate Body’s analysis in US Clove Cigarettes indicates that reducing smoking is a legitimate public health
objective. Yet unlike US Clove Cigarettes, where Indonesia argued,
albeit unsuccessfully, that the exemption of menthol cigarettes was
a disguised restriction on international trade and therefore negated
the legitimacy of the stated objective, no such argument will be
available in this case. Here, the TPPA’s plain packaging measures
apply to “all tobacco products.” Moreover, the objective of the TPPA
arguably falls squarely in line with the objectives of the labeling
measure implemented in US COOL if interpreted as an effort to prevent deceptive practices by providing consumers information about
tobacco products. 110
While Ukraine or other joining parties may make a creative argument as to why Australia’s objective to reduce smoking falls short
of legitimacy, it is unlikely that this aspect of the analysis will garner
much attention given the plain language of Article 2.2 and the Appel37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 151 Side A
12/28/2015 14:43:02

105. Trade, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy and Health: Glossary of Globalization, Trade and
Health Terms: Tobacco, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story089/en/
(last visited Aug. 29, 2015).
106. See id. “Of the 100 million projected tobacco-related deaths over the next 20 years,
about half will be of people in the productive ages of 35-69. In general, 9% of women in developing countries and about 22% in developed countries currently smoke. Without robust and
sustained initiatives, these figures are expected to rise dramatically, with today’s 250 million
women smokers rising to 340 million by 2020.” Id.
107. Media Centre – Tobacco Fact Sheet 339, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs339/en/ (last updated July 2015).
108. Id.
109. Ukraine Launches WTO Challenge Against Australia Cigarette Packaging Law, INT’L
CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. 16
BRIDGES
(Mar.
21,
2012),
http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/ukraine-launches-wto-challenge-againstaustralia-cigarette-packaging-law (data provided by the Australian government shows that
smoking has a high rate of mortality; “smoking kills 15,000 Australians annually”).
110. This is comparable to the legitimate objective found in US COOL Appellate Body
Report, discussed supra note 27, ¶ 351.
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late Body’s interpretation in US Clove Cigarettes. Instead, the majority of the argument and analysis will likely take place under the
“Necessary” test of the second prong.
2. More Trade Restrictive than Necessary to Achieve the Legitimate Objective?
In determining whether the TPPA is more restrictive than necessary to achieve a legitimate objective, the panel will consider the
following factors as established by the above-mentioned cases:
(i) the degree of contribution made by the measure to the legitimate objective at issue;
(ii)the trade-restrictiveness of the measure; and
(iii) the nature of the risks at issue and the gravity of consequences that would arise from non-fulfillment of the objective(s). 111

12/28/2015 14:43:02

111. US Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra note 28, ¶ 322.
112. Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Minutes of the Meeting of 15-16 June 2011, ¶
29, WTO Doc. G/TBT/M/54 (Sept. 20, 2011) [hereinafter TBT Committee June 2011] (“Australia noted that tobacco packaging was, simply put, one of the last remaining forms of tobacco
advertising in Australia and plain packaging legislation was therefore the next logical step in
Australia’s tobacco control efforts.”).
113. Id. ¶ 30.
114. Id.
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First, in determining the degree of contribution of the TPPA, it is
significant to note that tobacco packaging is “one of the last remaining forms of tobacco advertising in Australia . . .” 112 Thus, there is a
strong argument that the regulation of tobacco packaging will at
least make some level of contribution towards reducing tobacco use.
As the Appellate Body determined in US Clove Cigarettes, there is
no minimal threshold a regulation must meet in order to satisfy the
“contribution” prong of the analysis. The degree of the contribution
becomes important only when analyzed in relation to the trade restrictiveness of the measure and when compared to any proposed
alternative.
At the TBT Committee, Australia explained that the TPPA was
based on “extensive research and evidence that carefully explored
the impact of tobacco packaging.” 113 For example, Australia introduced evidence released by the Cancer Council of Australia
(“CCAC”), reviewing “research over two decades across five countries from 24 published experimental studies.” 114 The key findings
from the CCAC report were as follows:
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a) young adult smokers associate cigarette brand names and
package designs with positive personal characteristics, social
identity and aspirations;
b) packaging can create misperceptions about the relative
strengths, level of tar and health risk of tobacco products;
c) decreasing the number of design elements on a cigarette
pack reduces its appeal and perceptions about the likely enjoyment and desirability of smoking; and,
d) plain packaging increases the impact of health warnings. 115
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115. Id.
116. Melanie Wakefield et al., Introduction Effects of the Australian Plain Packaging Policy
on
Adult
Smokers:
A
Cross-sectional
Study,
BMJ
OPEN
(2013),
http://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/3/7/e003175.full.
117. Id. at 1.
118. Id. at 1.
119. TBT Committee June 2011, supra note 112, ¶ 27. There are 180 states that have
joined the WTO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, including both Australia and
Ukraine. See Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WHO
FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION
ON
TOBACCO
CONTROL,
http://www.who.int/fctc/signatories_parties/en/ (last updated Feb. 12, 2015). However, at the
TBT Committee, Ukraine argued that Australia’s plain packaging measure could not be justified under the WHO FCTC because the plain packaging requirements went far beyond the
obligations set out within the WHO FCTC. See TBT Committee June 2011, supra note 112, ¶
13.
120. TBT Committee June 2011, supra note 112, ¶ 19.
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After the official implementation of the TPPA in September
2012, the CCAC conducted a second study during the Act’s rollout
period; the organization released a report on its findings in July of
2013. 116 The comprehensive study included population surveys of
attitudes and behaviors relating to smoking, and found that “compared with smokers smoking from branded packs, smokers who
were smoking from the new plain packs were more likely to perceive
their tobacco as being lower in quality and tended to be lower in
satisfaction, were more likely to think about and prioritize quitting,
and more likely to support the plain packaging policy.” 117
Moreover, while Australia is the first nation to successfully implement plain packaging, 118 the WHO FCTC issued guidelines in
2008 recommending its parties to consider the introduction of plain
packaging. 119 Moreover, the parties to the WHO FCTC have agreed
that health measures for tobacco control are crucial to establishing
national health policies to protect their populations. 120 As mentioned,
the Panel in US Clove Cigarettes took into account the WHO
FCTC’s guidelines recommending its parties to regulate flavored
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See US Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 26, ¶ 7.413 and accompanying
US Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra note 28, ¶ 160.
US COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 27, ¶¶ 287, 348.
US Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra note 28, ¶ 330.
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121.
text.
122.
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124.
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tobacco. 121 Thus, the panel reviewing the Australia TPPA dispute
will almost certainly take the WHO FCTC’s recommendations into
consideration, along with any relevant evidence, to determine that
the plain packaging measure highly contributes to the legitimate
objective of protecting public health.
As to the second factor of the “Necessary” test, even if the adjudicating panel finds that the TPPA is highly trade-restrictive, standing alone, that determination will not be dispositive. For example, in
US Tuna II, the panel held that the “dolphin-safe” labeling scheme
was trade-restrictive because it structurally prevented Mexican fisheries from gaining access to the label, thus altering the market in the
United States’ favor. 122 Similarly, in US COOL, the panel found that
the United States’ labeling requirements for meat produced by imported cattle and hogs was trade-restrictive, as it altered the market
by incentivizing domestic retailers to purchase domestic cattle and
hogs so they could avoid the labeling hassle altogether. 123 Yet, in
both cases, the Appellate Body held that the respective regulations
did not violate Article 2.2 of the TBT. While the analysis from US
Tuna II is arguably more applicable to the current case than US
COOL, the latter case demonstrates a valuable point: despite the
Appellate Body’s suspicions that the measure could have been
found inconsistent with Article 2.2 if the Appellate Body would have
had the appropriate evidence in front of it, the Appellate Body ultimately upheld the regulation. This illustrates the Appellate Body’s
willingness to give great deference to domestic regulations where
they are in furtherance of a legitimate social concern.
In US Tuna II, the Appellate Body upheld the measure after
finding that Mexico failed to propose an alternative that would contribute to achieving the legitimate objective of dolphin protection,
considering the risks at issue and the consequences of nonfulfillment. In other words, Mexico’s proposed alternative would not create the same incentive to implement dolphin-safe fishing practices,
and the result (more dead or seriously injured dolphins) was gauged
to be very undesirable. 124 But in US COOL, the analysis suggests
that the regulation may have been found inconsistent with Article 2.2

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 153 Side A

12/28/2015 14:43:02

10 GAUL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

DIVERGENT VALUES IN GLOBAL TRADING

12/10/2015 11:19 AM

291

US COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 27, ¶¶ 476, 478-79.
Id. ¶¶ 479, 491.
US Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 26, ¶ 7.422.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7.423
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had the Appellate Body been able to adduce the appropriate evidence (including that of a proposed alternative) because the current
labels were complicated and confusing. Therefore, because consumers probably did not understand or value the majority of the information on the label (because they did not understand it), the
consequence that would arise from implementing an alternative that
failed to fulfill the objective (to provide the consumer with certain
information about their meat products), would be minimal at best. 125
However, the Appellate Body determined that, in the absence of a
proposed viable alternative, a little information is better than no information at all. Thus, it refused to strike down the regulation under
Article 2.2. 126 This reaffirms the idea that trade-restrictiveness is not
itself a violation of TBT, as the agreement gives weight to social
regulations in pursuit of legitimate objectives. Under TBT Article 2.1,
trade-restrictiveness is a violation where it is not applied evenhandedly (de jure or de facto discrimination); but under TBT Article
2.2, trade restrictiveness is measured as it relates to contribution to
the legitimate objective and the risk of nonfulfillment.
Furthermore, as solidified by the TBT jurisprudence, Ukraine
will need to show a viable alternative in order to have any shot at
success. In US Clove Cigarettes, the Panel upheld the United
States’ outright ban on clove cigarettes, after conceding that the
proposed alternatives (including “placing strict requirements on
packaging” 127 and “requiring health warnings” 128) proposed by Indonesia would be “less trade-restrictive.” 129 Following this line of reasoning, Australia might argue that, in the instant TPPA dispute, the
plain packaging requirements and required health warnings are certainly “less trade-restrictive” than the ban in US Clove Cigarettes.
But because the ban in US Clove Cigarettes applied only to flavored
cigarettes, not all tobacco, there is no guarantee that the adjudicating panel in the TPPA dispute will find such logic convincing. In other words, an outright ban on one category of cigarettes might be
considered more trade-restrictive than placing strict packaging requirements on that one category, but less trade-restrictive than strict
packaging regulations that apply to all categories of tobacco.
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130. TBT Committee June 2011, supra note 112, ¶ 10.
131. See US Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra note 28, ¶ 330 (noting that Mexico’s
proposed alternative would not contribute to the objective of protecting dolphins to the same
degree as the United States’ current measure).
132. US Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 26, ¶ 7.423 (the Panel stated that “the
mere listing of two dozen alternative measures without more does not show that such
measures would make an equivalent contribution to the achievement of the objective”).
133. US COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 27, ¶ 469 (upholding the traderestrictive COOL measure in the absence of sufficient evidence for a proposed alternative).
134. See TBT Committee June 2011, supra note 112 and accompanying text.
135. See generally Tobacco in Australia: Advertising—State and Territory Legislation, THE
CANCER COUNCIL, http://www.tobaccoinaustralia.org.au/11-4-state-and-territory-legislation (last
updated May 2015).
136. Id. New South Wales, South Australia, and Tasmania have previously enacted tobacco regulations requiring tobacco products and displays to display graphic health warnings.
137. 4125.0 Gender Indicators, Australia, Jan 2013, Smoking, Key Series, AUSTL. BUREAU
STATISTICS
(Jan.
30,
2013),
OF
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Ukraine (or any complainant) might contend, inter alia, that Australia could have adopted a less strict packaging requirement that
would allow trademarks to appear on the packaging. For example, at
the TBT Committee, Chile expressed concerns with the plain packaging aspect of the TPPA, suggesting that Australia could achieve
the same objective through the use of “better, newer information in
visible health warnings without affecting the legitimate use of the
brand names to differentiate between manufacturers.” 130 However,
even if this question is answered in the affirmative, it is not dispositive of the analysis. First, as the Appellate Body emphasized in US
Tuna II, 131 US Clove Cigarettes, 132 and US COOL, 133 the complaining party bears the burden of proof to show sufficient evidence that
such a proposed alternative would make an equivalent contribution
to the objective. However, it is important to note that, in this case,
tobacco packaging is one of the last remaining sources of tobacco
advertising left in Australia. 134 Thus, Australia will certainly have the
opportunity to argue, as the United States did in US Clove Cigarettes, that there are other measures in place that have failed to
achieve Australia’s legitimate objective of protecting public health. 135
For example, several Australian territories have already implemented a requirement for graphic health warnings on cigarette packs. 136
While Australia may argue that these previously enacted regulations fail to contribute to the achievement of protecting public health,
a complaining party might point to available research studies in an
effort to refute Australia’s contention. For example, one research
study shows an overall decrease of smoking in Australia from 2001
to 2011-2012. 137 Thus, a complaining party may argue that since
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smoking rates are steadily declining, Australia’s previous methods of
tobacco regulation are already working to protect public health, and
therefore a more trade-restrictive measure is not necessary. However, as the Appellate Body has emphasized, a member has the
right “to achieve its desired level of protection with respect to the
objective pursued.” 138 Therefore, even if smoking rates are shown to
have decreased by 5% for females and 7% for males since 2001, 139
Australia may still argue that it seeks a greater level of protection to
public health than the prior regulations could afford. And finally, the
adjudicating panel must consider the serious risks to public health
that are at issue here, and the consequences that nonfulfillment will
create (e.g., continued disease and death among Australia’s smoking population). This last deliberation will serve to buttress Australia’s contention that the TPPA is necessary to achieve Australia’s
desired level of protection of public health.
CONCLUSION
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http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4125.0main+features3320Jan%202013
[hereinafter AUSTL. BUREAU OF STATISTICS]. Between 2001 and 2011-12, overall rates of smoking have decreased for both males and females. The age standardized rate of current smokers for males aged 18 years and over fell from 27% in 2001 to 20% in 2011-12, and declined
from 21% in 2001 to 16% for females.
138. US Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 26, ¶ 7.370 and accompanying text.
139. AUSTL. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, supra note 137 and accompanying text.
140. See Cho, supra note 2, at 673 (citing Panel Report, United States – Sections 301310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶ 7.76, WTO Doc. WT/DS152/R (Jan. 27, 2000). “The global
trading system is ‘composed not only of States but also, indeed mostly, of individual economic
operators,’ such as producers, importers, and consumers.” Id. at 674.
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The trio of cases decided under TBT Article 2.2 reveals that
dispute resolution in the context of multilateral trading mandates a
careful consideration of social and regulatory concerns, and affirms
that there is a positive right to regulation. Effective balancing of freetrade and social concerns is imperative for trade facilitation in an
ever-innovating era of increasing economic interdependency. Where
individuals, private and public institutions, and governments must
interact with and depend on one another in order to thrive, some
disputes are inevitable. However, the WTO must maintain its reputation of legitimacy in the eyes of all stakeholders, so as to avoid the
same fate as the old GATT. 140 While some may argue that the pendulum has swung too far in a reactionary fashion, this Note suggests
that equilibrium is closer to actualization than ever before. To that
end, it is argued that the most fundamental concern underlying free-
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trade—efficiency141—will be better achieved by a global trading system that does not minimize the legitimate social concerns of its participants, as this will facilitate trust, thereby incentivizing
participation. Additionally, where the delicate balance between free
markets and social regulation is achieved, long-term efficiency can
be promulgated by stability and predictability. 142 Arguably, efficiency
is best served by the WTO’s use of already existing built-in legislative enactments, like the TBT, rather than starting anew in entirely
uncharted territory. 143
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See id. at 626 (noting that free markets are driven by the principle of efficiency).
See id.
W ORLD TRADE ORG., WORLD TRADE REPORT 2012, TRADE AND PUBLIC POLICIES: A
CLOSER LOOK AT NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2012),
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report12_e.pdf.
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